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NOTE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Criminal Procedure-The
Fourth Amendment and The Wisconsin Constitutional Provision Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures. State
v. Starke, 81 Wis. 2d 399, 260 N.W.2d 739 (1978).
There was of course no way of knowing whether you were
being watched at any given moment. How often, or on what
system, the Thought Police plugged in on any individualwire
was guesswork. It was even conceivable that they watched
everybody all the time. But at any rate they could plug in
your wire whenever they wanted to. George Orwell, Nineteen
Eighty-Four.'

A massive amount of information is in fact available to a
prying bureaucracy 2 and, at least in the area of bank records,
the search and seizure provision of the fourth amendment to
the United States Constitution' has proved to be a brittle
shield. This note will examine recent decisions of the United
States and Wisconsin Supreme Courts4 which dealt with the
protection afforded by the fourth amendment and the comparable state constitutional provision 5 when officials seize an individual's bank records from banking institutions to serve as
evidence of crime by the bank customer. Particular attention
will be paid to Justice Shirley Abrahamson's concurring opinion in State v. Starke,6 which advocated the use of the search
1. THE ORWELL READER at 397 (1956 ed.).
2. See Sanford, CaliforniaBankers Association v. Schultz: An Attack on the Bank
Secrecy Act, 2 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 203, 204-06, 218 (1975).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV reads as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
4. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); California Bankers Association
v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974); State v. Starke, 81 Wis. 2d 399, 260 N.W.2d 739 (1978).
See also Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166
(1974); Alexander & Spurgeon, Privacy, Banking Records and the Supreme Court:A
Before and After Look at Miller, 10 Sw. U.L. Rv. 13 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Alexander & Spurgeon].
5. The text of art. I, § 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution is the same as that of the
fourth amendment. There are slight differences in punctuation.
6. 81 Wis. 2d at 419-23, 260 N.W.2d at 749-52. Justice Heffernan joined in the
concurring opinion.
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and seizure provision of the Wisconsin Constitution in place of

the fourth amendment.
United States v. Miller7 held that a bank depositor had "no
protectable Fourth Amendment interest ' 8 in records kept by a
bank pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 and obtained
by the police as evidence of criminal activity on the part of the
depositor. Following logically from this holding was the Court's
validation of the use of subpoenas duces tecum, rather than
warrants, to obtain such records.' 0
For a full understanding of the implications of Miller, attention must first be directed to California Bankers Association
v. Schultz." That decision upheld the constitutionality of the
Bank Secrecy Act and, in so doing, called the claim by
plaintiff-bankers of a possible fourth amendment violation premature.' 2 The Act provides for the keeping of records by banks
of depositor's transactions to aid in possible criminal prosecutions' 3 but makes no provision for the seizure of such records.
The Court therefore reasoned that any adjudication of a claim
based on the legal process used to seize the records would have
to await a proper party and an actual seizure.' 4
Thereafter, in Miller, faced with such a set of facts, the
Court held that the defendant had no protected property or
privacy interest in the bank records. Dealing first with the
question of property interests, the Court found that, since the
records obtained by subpoena were copies made by the bank
rather than the depositor's originals, the depositor could not
claim a proprietary interest in them.'5 Citing Katz v. United
States,'6 the Court also undertook a privacy analysis, with the
same result. Reasoning that defendant had "knowingly
expos[ed]" his personal affairs to the public by maintaining
a bank account, the Court stated that the depositor had as7.

425 U.S. 435 (1976).
8. Id. at 437.
9. § 101, 12 U.S.C. 1829b(d) (1976).
10. 425 U.S. at 445-46.
11. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
12. Id. at 51-54.
13. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(2) (1976).
14. 416 U.S. at 51-52. The Court suggested that the depositor would be the proper
party to adjudicate such a claim. Id.
15. 425 U.S. at 440-41.
16. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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sumed the risk that the records might also be exposed to the
government. After such a knowing exposure, the Court found
no "reasonable expectation of privacy" on the part of the depositor could exist; defendant therefore had no protected privacy interest in his bank records.' 7
The Miller Court's reliance on Katz"' in support of this
position was strained. In Katz, the defendant's phone booth
conversations were the subject of a warrantless tap by the
F.B.I. The Supreme Court rejected petitioner's formulation of
the issue in terms of constitutionally protected areas and held
that the "Fourth Amendment protects people not places.""' In
excluding the fruits of the wiretap, the Court discredited the
traditional property analysis, finding that it no longer controlled the right of the government to search and seize. 2
In concurrence, Justice Harlan formulated a test for this
"reasonable expectation of privacy," concluding that the protection would be afforded subject to a "twofold requirement,
first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "21 It takes no
great leap of faith, after examining the reasoning used in Katz,
to believe that, had the Miller Court followed the logic of that
decision, the latter case would have been decided differently.
In the recent decision of State v. Starke,2 2 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court was presented with and declined the opportunity to decide a similar issue under article I, section 11 of the
Wisconsin Constitution. 2s Chief Merrill Starke of the Pewaukee
Police Department was arrested in August of 1976 for sundry
offenses allegedly committed as a public servant. 2 The chief
17. 425 U.S. at 442-43.
18. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
19. Id. at 350-51.
20. Id. at 353. Justice Black, in dissent, charted the history of the property analysis. Id. at 364-74 (Black, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Under this test, of course, any expectation
by depositors that their bank records were private could be overcome by the mere
posting of a notice stating the contrary. See 76 MICH. L. REv. 154, 157-58 (1977) and
text accompanying notes 55-58 infra.
22. 81 Wis. 2d 399, 260 N.W.2d 739 (1978).
23. Id. at 414-15, 260 N.W.2d at 747-48.
24. These offenses included theft, procuring and causing to be procured a false and
fraudulent insurance claim, obstructing justice and misconduct in public office. Id. at
403, 260 N.W.2d at 742.
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was accused of "fixing" traffic citations for family members
and selling contraband firearms. At the time of his arrest, he
allegedly locked an unexecuted arrest warrant against a niece
and another in his desk drawer. Later that day, Waukesha
officials procured a search warrant for Starke's desk and files,
whereupon the aforementioned warrants and other pieces of
evidence were seized.2
The investigation of Starke's activities continued and on
August 13, 1976, a search warrant was issued to procure records
of Starke's checking account from his bank. Pursuant to the
warrant, Starke's bank records were seized to be used as evidence at his trial. After the information was filed against
Starke in January 1977, he moved to suppress evidence obtained in the two searches and evidence which was the fruit of
those searches."
The trial court held that the warrants were based on overbroad affidavits which lacked probable cause; a blanket suppression motion was therefore granted. Thereafter, the prosecution conceded that without this evidence it could not proceed
2
and the case was dismissed. 1
On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, finding
and no
sufficient probable cause to support the first warrant
28
overbreadth in the affidavit supporting the warrant.
The court held further that the warrant issued for the
search of Starke's bank records was based upon probable cause.
Therefore, the court declined to decide the question of the necessity of a warrant in such a case. "We do not reach this
argument. On the facts presented, we conclude that the search
under review was conducted pursuant to a valid warrant. It is
therefore unnecessary to determine whether a warrantless
29
search would have been objectionable. 1
In arguing that no privacy or property rights attached to
Starke's bank records, the state had asserted that Miller made
a warrant unnecessary since "no intrusion into any area in
which respondent had a protected Fourth Amendment inter25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

403-04, 260 N.W.2d
405-06, 260 N.W.2d
406-07, 260 N.W.2d
412, 260 N.W.2d at
414-15, 260 N.W.2d

at 742-43.
at 743.
at 743-44.
746.
at 748.
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est" 3° had been made. Seeking to avoid Miller, the defendant
argued that the court should focus on article I, section 11 of the
Wisconsin Constitution rather than the fourth amendment and
suggested that Miller, decided under the Federal Constitution,
was not controlling on the court's interpretation of the state
3
constitutional provision. '
While the majority refused to reach this issue, Justice Abrahamson, concurring in the result, reasoned that "the majority
goes at this issue backwards. The first issue to decide is
whether bank depositors have a constitutionally protected interest in these bank records. If depositors have a constitutionally protected interest, they can object to the validity of a

warrant ....

"32

Conceding that the wording of article I, section 11 is identical to that of the fourth amendment, Justice Abrahamson emphasized her belief that rulings under the state constitution
should be developed independently of the federal. 3 Citing
State v. Doe,34 she reiterated that it is this state's prerogative
to give greater protection to personal liberties if "it is the judgment of [the Wisconsin Supreme Court] that the Constitution
of Wisconsin and the laws of this state require that greater
protection . . . ought to be afforded. ' 35 And it was her judgment that in the case of bank records, that greater protection
should indeed be afforded. While not citing Katz, Justice Abrahamson stated that the "reasonable expectation of privacy"
test 3 should be the touchstone in deciding whether or not one
has a constitutionally protected interest against unreasonable
search and seizure under the Wisconsin Constitution: "I would
hold that each person has a reasonable expectation of privacy
in his or her bank statement and records which is protected
'3
under art. I, sec. 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.
30. 425 U.S. at 440.
31. Brief for Defendant in Error at 24, State v. Starke, 81 Wis. 2d 399, 260 N.W.2d
739 (1978).
32. Id. at 419, 260 N.W.2d at 750 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
33. 78 Wis. 2d 161, 254 N.W.2d 210 (1977).
34. 81 Wis. 2d at 421, 260 N.W.2d at 751 (quoting State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161,
172, 254 N.W.2d 210, 216 (1977)).
35. Id.
36. See 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining twofold test).
37. 81 Wis. 2d at 421, 260 N.W.2d at 751.
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Such was the reasoning employed by the California
Supreme Court in Burrows v. Superior Court,38 upon which
Justice Abrahamson relied. In Burrows, bank records of an
attorney charged with misappropriation of funds were provided
to authorities by a bank upon request. 9 Justice Mosk, writing
for a unanimous majority, found such action to be violative of
the California Constitution's prohibition against unreasonable
search and seizure. 0 The California court outlined a two-tiered
test for determining the legality of a search under the state
constitution. First, it must be decided "whether a person has
exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy."'" If so, under
this analysis, the question becomes "whether that expectation
has been violated by unreasonable governmental intrusion."4' 2
As to the first test the court concluded that,
A bank customer's reasonable expectation is that, absent
compulsion by legal process, the matters he reveals to the
bank will be utilized by the bank only for internal banking
purposes [and] that the bank would maintain the confidentiality of those papers which originated with him in check
form and of the bank statements into which a record of those
same checks had been transformed .... 43
Thereafter, the court found that the warrantless taking in
Burrows was unreasonable.
If this search may be deemed reasonable, nothing could prevent any law enforcement officer from informally requesting
and obtaining all of a person's or business entity's records
which had been confided to a bank, though such records
might have no relevance to a crime, if any, under investigation; and those records could be introduced into evidence in
any subsequent criminal prosecution."
Justice Abrahamson, quoting extensively from Burrows,
advocated the adoption of the California court's reasoning by
the Wisconsin court. To summarize her approach, she would
38. 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974).
39. Id. at 240-41, 529 P.2d at 591, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 167.
40. Id. at 245, 529 P.2d at 594-95, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 170-71. The wording of the
California search and seizure section is substantially identical to that of the fourth
amendment and Wisconsin Constitution. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13; 13 Cal. 3d at 242
n.2, 529 P.2d at 593 n.2, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 169 n.2.
41. Id. at 243, 529 P.2d at 593, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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not, in the first instance, depart from Justice Powell's analysis
in Miller. The threshold question, then, is whether a party
contesting the search has a constitutionally protected interest.0 45 It is at this point that Justice Abrahamson would part
ways with the federal judiciary and reach a contrary conclusion, as the California court did in Burrows.46 In contrast to
Miller, she would find a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in
bank records under this state's constitution. From that point
she would evaluate the reasonableness of the search. Thus, in
Starke, while a constitutionally protected interest would be
present under this analysis, the result would not differ from
that of the majority.
The distinction between the Starke majority formulation
and the approach taken in the concurring opinion is that, under
the latter, a workable and independent mechanism for evaluating the legality of searches under the state constitution was
suggested. This analysis appears to be the only method of
avoiding the "rock and hard place," predicament faced by a
bank depositor in light of California Bankers Association and
Miller. Justice Marshall, dissenting in Miller, noted this dilemma:
"[1]t is ironic that although the majority deems the bank
customer's Fourth Amendment claims premature, it also intimates that once the bank has made copies of a customer's
checks, the customer no longer has standing to invoke his
Fourth Amendment rights when a demand is made on the
bank by the Government for the records. . . . By accepting
the Government's bifurcated approach to the recordkeeping
requirement and the acquisition of the records, the majority
engages in a hollow charade whereby Fourth Amendment
claims are to be labeled premature until such time as they
can be deemed too late . . . . Today, not surprisingly, the
Court finds respondent's claims to be made too late."4
Disallowance of a depositor's objections gives law enforcement agencies leave to investigate an individual's bank records
at will. Moreover, the potential for abuse of discretion by ad45. "We find that there was no intrusion into any area in which respondent had a
protected Fourth Amendment interest." 425 U.S. at 440.
46. 81 Wis. 2d at 421, 260 N.W.2d at 751 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
47. 425 U.S. at 455 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting California Bankers Ass'n v.
Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 97 (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
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ministrative agencies in issuing summonses is real." Contrary
to Justice Mosk's pre-Miller observation, it does indeed seem
"open season on personal bank records. '49
After Miller, it is obviously for the states to afford whatever
protection is to exist in this area. Justice Abrahamson's approach, borrowed from Burrows,50 is no more than a logical
extension of the Katz privacy-centered analysis." Miller, on
the other hand, has been fairly criticized as a "return to...
eighteenth century [property] analysis"52 because of its approach to records as the property of the bank and not of the
depositor. Additionally, the Miller Court's assumption of
risk/waiver analysis lacks a firm basis. Indeed, the Miller
Court, in citing Katz for the proposition that "[w]hat a person
knowingly exposes to the public. . . is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection, 5 3 appears to have forgotten the line
following: "But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."5 4
48. See Alexander & Spurgeon, supra note 4, at 14. Most of the potential evils of
free discretion of I.R.S. agents in using administrative summonses have been remedied
by the Tax Reform Act of 1976. Id. at 31-32. Likewise, some procedural protection has
been afforded by the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92
Stat. 3697 (1978). This legislation, however, is directed against federal agencies and
personnel and would have no effect on state law enforcement officials in a situation
like that presented in Starke. Id. at § 1101(3).
49. 13 Cal. 3d at 247, 529 P.2d at 595, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 171-72.
50. The state's argument in Starke indicates a belief that Burrows is no longer a
viable state constitution interpretation since it was pre-Miller. Reply Brief of Plaintiff
in Error at 5-6, State v. Starke, 81 Wis. 2d 399, 260 N.W.2d 739 (1978). This is not so;
after Miller the California Supreme Court reaffirmed the Burrows holding that a
bank customer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his other records. See
Athearn v. State Bar, 20 Cal. 3d 232, 235, 571 P.2d 628, 629, 142 Cal. Rptr. 171, 172
(1977). And the California Legislature has codified the Burrows holding. See CAL.
GoV'T CODE §§ 7460-93 (West Supp. 1979). Justice Brennan embraced the logic of
Burrows in his dissent to Miller. 425 U.S. at 447-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
At least one other state has cited Burrows and recognized a state constitutionally
protected interest in bank accounts. See State v. McCray, 15 Wash. App. 810, 551 P.2d
1376 (1976).
51. "[Ihe premise that property interests control the right of the Government
to search and seize has been discredited." 389 U.S. at 353 (quoting Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)). See also Alexander & Spurgeon, supra note 4, at 14, 22-26;
Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 MICH. L. REv.
154 (1977).
52. Alexander & Spurgeon, supra note 4, at 14.
53. 425 U.S. at 442 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (1967)).
54. 389 U.S. at 351.
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Any test should then hinge upon the depositor's reasonable
expectation of privacy. However, since it has been suggested
that the government could negate any such expectation simply
by posting notice that one's bank account will be searched,55
the test should be refined one degree further. In order to avoid
loss of one's constitutionally protected interest, the right of an
expectation of privacy as to bank records and not the subjective
expectation itself should be the linchpin." "The test must recN ognize that the advance notice that certain searches will be
57
conducted is an intrusion in itself."
In summary, if there is a concern in this state for the privacy interests of bank depositors, Justice Abrahamson's concurrence in State v. Starke should be well noted. A test recognizing the right to a reasonable expectation of privacy in confidential bank records58 and then analyzing any particular search
as reasonable or unreasonable could be adopted under article
I, section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.
This state has given broader recognition to civil liberties
than the federal courts in years past. 9 In the area of bank
records, the court, following its own lead, should recall that,
Long before it was constrained to do so by the fourth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution,
this court relying on the Wisconsin Constitution sustained
and enforced the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures."
JOEL L. MASSIE
55. Note, A Reconsiderationof the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 MICH. L.
REv. 154, 157-58 (1977).
56. Id. at 164.
57. Id.
58. The bank records are merely copies of depositor's private papers which could
not, of course, be seized from him or her without a properly executed warrant. See,
e.g., Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89 (1923)(exclusionary rule for unlawful
search and seizures thirty-eight years before Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961));
Carpenter v. Dane County, 9 Wis. 249 (1859) (right to counsel 102 years before Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)).
59. Laasch v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 587, 598, 267 N.W.2d 278, 285 (1978) (Abrahamson,
J., concurring).

